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On June 22, 2006, the United States Supreme Court broadened 
the purview of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII1 when it held 
that the provision prohibits employer actions that would be 
considered materially adverse by a reasonable employee, regardless 
of whether such actions occurred at the workplace or were related to 
employment.2 In so holding, the Supreme Court did three things 
worthy of comment. First, the Court expunged the confusion caused 
by disparate and incompatible treatments of the anti-retaliation 
provision by the circuit courts. Second, by subjecting all employer 
action to review, the Court reassured employees that by pursuing or 
assisting the pursuit of a discrimination claim the employees need not 
endure, without recourse, dissuasive actions of their employer that are 
marginally work-related. Third, by instituting a coherent materially 
adverse standard, the Court assuaged a common fear of employers 
that workplace conduct chronologically proximate to a claim of 
discrimination is kindling for an anti-retaliation claim. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A dispute between Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway 
Company, the petitioner, and Sheila White, the respondent, afforded 
the Supreme Court the opportunity to articulate its most recent 
interpretation of Title VII. That dispute commenced in the summer of 
1997 when Burlington Northern hired White as a track laborer in its 
Maintenance and Way department.3 As a track laborer, White’s job 
duties included removing and replacing track components, 
transporting track material, cutting brush, and clearing litter and 
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cargo spillage.4 However, soon after being hired, White was told that 
she would be operating a forklift instead.5 
In September of 1997, White complained to Burlington Northern 
officials that her immediate supervisor, Bill Joiner, had not only 
frequently commented to her that women should not be working in 
the Maintenance and Way department, but that he also directed 
insulting and inappropriate remarks to her in front of her male co-
workers.6 After an internal investigation, Joiner was suspended for ten 
days and ordered to attend sexual-harassment training, and White was 
told to discontinue her operation of the forklift and to resume the 
standard track laborer job duties.7 White was informed that the 
impetus for her reassignment was co-worker complaints that a “more 
senior man” should have the “less arduous and cleaner job” of forklift 
operator.8 The change in White’s job duties did not alter her pay or 
benefits.9 
In October of 1997, White filed a retaliation charge with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming that her 
reassignment constituted an unlawful retaliation for her September 
complaint about Joiner.10 Despite filing the charge, White continued 
working for Burlington Northern until December of 1997 when, after 
a disagreement with her immediate supervisor, White was suspended 
without pay for allegedly being insubordinate.11 Subsequent internal 
grievance procedures concluded that White had not been 
insubordinate, and she was consequently reinstated and awarded 
backpay for the thirty-seven days she was suspended.12 White filed an 
additional retaliation charge for her suspension.13 
After exhausting her administrative remedies under the EEOC, 
White filed suit against Burlington Northern in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Tennessee claiming that 
Burlington Northern, in changing her job responsibilities and 
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suspending her for thirty-seven days, had unlawfully retaliated against 
her in violation of Title VII.14 The jury returned a verdict in favor of 
White on her retaliation claim.15 A divided Sixth Circuit panel 
reversed the judgment.16 
II.  SIXTH CIRCUIT INTERPRETATION OF THE ANTI-
RETALIATION PROVISION 
The Sixth Circuit reheard the case en banc and agreed with the 
District Court that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find 
that the thirty-seven-day unpaid suspension, as well as the transfer to 
a more arduous and dirtier job, constituted unlawful retaliation.17 
However, indicative of the disagreement between the other circuit 
courts, the majority and minority construed the phrase “discriminate 
against” in Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision differently.18 
Title VII does not define “discriminate against,”19 thus obliging 
courts to breathe life into the phrase before it can be applied to the 
facts.20 Consequently, the various circuit courts have reached different 
conclusions regarding both whether an employer action challenged 
under the provision must be employment or workplace related, and 
how harmful or injurious an employer action must be to constitute 
retaliation.21 
An eight-judge majority of the en banc Sixth Circuit held that in 
order to “prevent lawsuits based upon trivial workplace 
dissatisfactions,” a plaintiff must prove the existence of an adverse 
employment action in an anti-retaliation claim.22 According to the 
majority, an adverse employment action is a “materially adverse 
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change in the terms and conditions of [the employee’s] 
employment.”23 Contained within that definition of adverse 
employment action were two requisite directives for the resolution of 
anti-retaliation claims in the Sixth Circuit.24 First, only changes in 
“terms and conditions of employment” would be scrutinized by the 
court.25 Second, to be actionable, those changes must be “materially 
adverse” to the employee.26 
The Sixth Circuit’s definition of adverse employment action was 
narrower than some and broader than other definitions proffered by 
the various circuit courts. For example, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits 
held that only “ultimate employment decisions”—acts such as hiring, 
granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating—would be 
subject to review.27 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit held that as 
long as the employer’s action was “reasonably likely to deter” 
employees from engaging in activity protected by the provision, that 
action would be prohibited.28 
Although a six-judge minority of the en banc Sixth Circuit agreed 
with the majority’s rejection of the “untenable” ultimate employment 
action doctrine of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits,29 it disagreed as to 
what constituted a sufficiently adverse employment action to invoke 
Title VII’s anti-retaliatory provision.30 The minority espoused utilizing 
the “reasonably likely to deter” standard adopted by the Ninth 
Circuit,31 contending that such a standard was more consistent with 
the statutory language of Title VII and Supreme Court precedent.32 
Thus, the holding of the en banc Sixth Circuit highlighted both the 
disagreement between and within the circuit courts as to the correct 
interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision. And as the holding 
occupied the vanguard in a long series of disparate and incompatible 
circuit court constructions of the anti-retaliation provision, the en 
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banc Sixth Circuit’s decision sufficiently captured the Supreme 
Court’s attention to warrant a grant of certiorari. 
III.  SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE ANTI-
RETALIATION PROVISION 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Title 
VII’s anti-retaliation provision “forbids only those employer actions 
and resulting harms that are related to employment or the 
workplace,” and to determine “how harmful an act of retaliatory 
discrimination must be in order to fall within the provision’s scope.”33 
The Court ultimately held that the anti-retaliation provision forbids 
those employer actions that would be considered materially adverse 
by a reasonable employee or job applicant, regardless of whether such 
actions occurred at the workplace or were related to employment.34 
A. Inside and Outside the Workplace 
The Court’s opinion, authored by Justice Breyer, expanded the 
scope of the anti-retaliation provision beyond that of the anti-
discrimination provision by first severing the link between the two 
provisions,35 a link that was integral to the Sixth Circuit holding that in 
order for an employer to violate Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision 
it must effect a materially adverse change in the “terms and 
conditions” of the employee’s employment.36 Contradicting the Sixth 
Circuit’s approach, the Court instructed that the anti-retaliation 
provision not be read in pari materia with the anti-discrimination 
provision.37 
In relevant part, Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail 
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion or national 
origin.38 
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The Court noted that the italicized words—hire, discharge, and 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment—do not 
appear in the anti-retaliation provision, which is significant because 
those words restrict the scope of the anti-discrimination provision to 
only those actions that either “affect employment or alter the 
conditions of the workplace.”39 In light of the Court’s established 
presumption that “Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the 
disparate inclusion or exclusion [it exhibits],”40 the Court observed 
that there is reason to believe that Congress intended the differences 
in scope that the language intimates.41 The Court attested that this 
belief is strengthened by a clear difference in purpose between the 
provisions: the anti-discrimination provision “seeks to prevent injury 
to individuals based on who they are,” and the anti-retaliation 
provision “seeks to prevent harms to individuals based on what they 
do.”42 In other words, “purpose reinforces what language already 
indicates.”43 
The Court analyzed this difference in purpose and concluded that 
although the objective of the anti-discrimination provision could be 
achieved without prohibiting anything other than employment-
related discrimination, the objective of the anti-retaliation provision 
could not be.44 
The Court recognized that employer retaliation against an 
employee can be just as effective outside the workplace as inside it.45 
To illustrate this recognition, the opinion pointed to Rochon v. 
Gonzales, wherein the FBI retaliated against an employee by refusing 
to investigate death threats made against that employee and his wife 
by a federal prisoner.46 The chilling effect such an action would have 
on further complaints is clear. And as enforcement of Title VII 
depends upon the willingness of employees to file complaints and act 
as witnesses, the Court concluded that “[i]nterpreting the anti-
retaliation provision to provide broad protection . . . helps assure the 
cooperation upon which accomplishment of the Act’s primary 
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objective depends.”47 Consequently, the anti-retaliation provision is 
not tied to any specific type of employer act; instead, it encompasses 
all employer acts.48 
B. Actionable Injury or Harm 
Regardless of the scope of the anti-retaliation provision, which 
subjects all employer conduct to scrutiny, only those employer actions 
that produce an injury or harm are prohibited.49 The Court, in accord 
with the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits, asserted that for 
the alleged harm or injury to be actionable a plaintiff must show a 
reasonable employee would have found the employer’s conduct 
materially adverse.50 For conduct to be considered materially adverse, 
the plaintiff must show that it “well might have” dissuaded a 
reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination.51 The Court explained that it used the phrase 
“materially adverse” because it wanted to clearly separate the 
actionable significant harms from the non-actionable trivial harms.52 
The Court argued that such a separation is important because the role 
of the anti-retaliation provision is to deter employers from hampering 
an employee’s “unfettered access” to Title VII’s remedies,53 and one 
can assume that trivial harms—“petty slights, minor annoyances, and 
simple lack of good manners”—will not hamper an employee’s access 
to such remedies.54 To assume otherwise would allow employees to 
inoculate themselves from those “petty slights or minor annoyances” 
that are an inevitable part of every work environment and that all 
employees endure.55 
In its attempt to instruct future courts as to how to apply this 
standard, the Court stressed that the materially adverse standard is 
“tied to the challenged retaliatory act,”56 but not the underlying 
conduct forming the basis of the Title VII complaint.57 The Court also 
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explained that the materially adverse standard is phrased in general 
terms because “the real social impact of workplace behavior often 
depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, 
expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a 
simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.”58 
Put more concisely, context matters.59 To illustrate the Court’s point, 
the opinion offered the following example: Altering an employee’s 
work schedule may be insignificant to most workers, but such a 
change may be quite significant to a young mother with school-age 
children.60 Thus, the Court provides not only a clear standard, but also 
direction and illustration to aid its application. 
In applying its materially adverse standard to the facts at issue in 
this case, the Court supplies a concise look at how this standard is to 
be utilized. The Court ultimately concluded that there was sufficient 
evidentiary basis to support the jury’s verdict on White’s retaliation 
claim.61 With regard to Burlington Northern reassigning White the job 
duties of a track laborer after it had assigned her the less arduous and 
cleaner duties of forklift operator, the Court noted that a jury could 
conclude that the reassignment to a more arduous and dirtier job with 
less prestige would have been materially adverse to a reasonable 
employee.62 With regard to the thirty-seven-day suspension, the Court 
reasoned that “an indefinite suspension without pay could well act as 
a deterrent, even if the suspended employee eventually received 
backpay.”63 The Court explained that White’s receipt of backpay did 
not cure the fact that both White and her family had to subsist for 
thirty-seven days without income, “not knowing whether or when 
White would return to work.”64 Consequently, the Court found that 
the jury reasonably concluded that White’s payless suspension was 
materially adverse.65 
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C. Prohibited Action in the Wake of the Burlington Northern Case 
Employees have been greatly benefited by the Court’s holding 
because all employer action is now subject to review in all circuits, 
regardless of whether such action occurs at the workplace or is 
related to employment. And although it is unlikely that employers 
will attempt to dissuade employees via actions that have absolutely no 
relationship to the workplace or employment, it is less unlikely that 
they will attempt to do so via actions that are marginally work related. 
Thus, this holding specifically benefits employees by reassuring them 
that in pursuing or assisting the pursuit of a discrimination claim an 
employee need not endure, without recourse, the marginally work-
related but nevertheless dissuasive actions of his or her employer. 
Remarkably, Justice Alito concluded that this benefit runs counter 
to Title VII because it “implies that the persons whom Title VII is 
principally designed to protect—victims of discrimination based on 
race, color, sex, national origin, or religion—receive less protection 
than victims of retaliation.”66 But this conclusion fails to note that the 
anti-retaliation provision protects victims of discrimination, whether it 
does so directly or indirectly. Thus, the fact that its scope is broader 
than that of the anti-discrimination provision actually affords victims 
of discrimination more protection, not less.67 For example, the anti-
retaliation provision prohibits an employer from retaliating against an 
employee for opposing a practice made unlawful by Title VII,68 which 
directly protects a victim of discrimination.69 The provision also 
prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who is 
testifying, assisting, or participating in an investigation, proceeding, or 
hearing under Title VII,70 which indirectly protects a victim of 
discrimination because it is a victim’s investigation, proceeding, or 
hearing that the employee, now protected from retaliation, is 
undeterred from assisting or participating in.71 
By expanding the scope of the anti-retaliation provision beyond 
that of the anti-discrimination provision, the Court benefited 
employees by providing broader Title VII protection than they would 
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have had if the reach of the provisions remained equal. Nevertheless, 
this enlargement of the anti-retaliation provision’s scope is unlikely to 
be perceived as a benefit by employers because it exacerbates a 
common fear that any workplace conduct chronologically proximate 
to a claim of discrimination is kindling for an anti-retaliation claim. 
Now, any employer conduct that attends a claim of discrimination is 
capable of stoking the fire of prosecution. Of course, due to the 
Court’s institution of a materially adverse standard, such acts must 
still meet a specific deterrence threshold: only employer acts that 
“well might . . . dissuade[]” a reasonable employee from making or 
supporting a charge of discrimination are actionable. Consequently, 
the use of a materially adverse standard should diminish employer 
apprehension that once an employee makes a charge of 
discrimination he must be handled with a velvet glove. 
Nonetheless, Justice Alito’s various disagreements with the 
majority’s materially adverse standard portend what will likely be 
other concerns of employers attempting to use this standard to guide 
their conduct in a post-Burlington Northern employment context. 
Justice Alito asserted that the majority’s standard is concerned with 
retaliation that well might dissuade an employee from making or 
supporting a charge of discrimination, and therefore the type of 
discrimination, more specifically its severity, must be taken into 
account.72 Because employees who have endured severe 
discrimination may not be easily dissuaded from complaining and vise 
versa, “the majority’s interpretation logically implies that the degree 
of protection afforded to a victim of retaliation is inversely 
proportional to the severity of the original act of discrimination that 
prompted the retaliation.”73 
Fortunately, in addressing Justice Alito’s arguments one can not 
only assuage these anticipated concerns, but also provide even more 
guidance as to what employer actions are now prohibited under the 
anti-retaliation provision. Justice Alito’s analysis ignores the clear 
statements of the majority opinion to the contrary. As the majority 
pointed out, “the standard is tied to the challenged retaliatory act, not 
the underlying conduct that forms the basis of the Title VII 
complaint.”74 More specifically, the majority expressly addressed 
 
 72. Id. at 2420. 
 73. Id. at 2420–21. 
 74. Id. at 2416 (majority opinion) 
 2007] BURLINGTON  NORTHERN & SANTE FE  RAILWAY CO. V. WHITE 35 
 
Alito’s criticism when it asserted that “this standard does not require 
the reviewing court or jury to consider ‘the nature of the 
discrimination that led to the filing of the charge.’”75 
This assertion is corroborated by the majority’s choice of language 
in communicating its materially adverse standard. The challenged 
action must dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting 
“a charge of discrimination.”76 Note that the majority did not use the 
definite article “the” before the noun phrase “charge of 
discrimination,” which would have clearly pointed at the specific 
charge of discrimination alleged by the plaintiff. Instead, the majority 
used the indefinite article “a.” An indefinite article “points to 
nonspecific objects, things, or persons that are not distinguished from 
the other members of a class.”77 Consequently, the definition of the 
indefinite article “a,” at the very least, intimates that the majority 
expects one to envision a generic charge of discrimination when 
determining whether the plaintiff well might have been dissuaded by 
the alleged retaliatory act. Thus, when applying the standard, an 
employer must simply consider whether the retaliation might well 
deter a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination 
in general, not the specific discrimination alleged by the employee.78 
Justice Alito also questioned the majority’s conception of the 
reasonable employee.79 One illustration provided by the majority 
involved a change in the work schedule of a young mother with 
school-age children.80 The majority contended that such an act may 
not disturb many employees, but may greatly disturb such a mother.81 
Justice Alito asserted that this illustration proves that the majority’s 
test does not concern the reasonable employee, but rather “a 
reasonable worker who shares at least some individual characteristics 
with the actual victim.”82 Justice Alito further asserted that the 
majority’s illustration introduced three individual characteristics (age, 
gender, and family responsibilities), and he expressed concern that 
“[h]ow many more individual characteristics a court or jury must 
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 79. Id. at 2421. 
 80. See id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 36 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR VOL. 2:25 
 
consider is unclear.”83 But Justice Alito appears to incorrectly equate 
context with individual characteristics. 
The majority placed the reasonable person in the employee’s 
context; it did not give the reasonable person the employee’s 
characteristics.84 The difference between the two approaches is best 
conveyed by the majority’s illustration of the young mother with 
school-age children. In considering the “constellation of surrounding 
circumstances, expectations, and relationships”85 revolving around a 
young mother with school-age children, jurors, judges, and prudent 
employers would be expected to place the reasonable person in a 
situation where he is an employee burdened with the expectations 
and circumstances that would typically accompany having to care for 
children.86 For example, a reasonable person who is required to work 
and, at the very least, is also expected to share in the responsibility of 
feeding, picking up, and supervising children will likely be more 
affected, and thus dissuaded, by a change in a work schedule than an 
employee unhindered by such responsibilities. 
Justice Alito’s final critique of the majority’s standard is that “well 
might dissuade” is a “loose and unfamiliar causation standard,”87 and 
“in an area of the law in which standards of causation are already 
complex, the introduction of this new and unclear standard is 
unwelcome.”88 The three-word combination “well might dissuade” is 
arguably unfamiliar. Nevertheless, the majority provides enough 
information and explanation to provide sufficient, if not clear, 
guidance for the standard’s interpretation and application. 
The language in the opinion, which was lifted verbatim from 
Rochon, places “well” directly before the word “might,” indicating 
that “well” modifies “might.”89 Although there are many definitions of 
the word “well,” the majority’s application of its causation standard to 
the facts shows that “well” is intended to augment “might” in a way 
that conveys a greater degree of likelihood than “might” would 
alone.90 More specifically, when applying its causation standard to the 
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facts, the majority determined that “an indefinite suspension without 
pay could well act as a deterrent.”91 In substituting “could” for 
“might,” the majority imparted that it considers “might well have” as 
synonymous with “could well have.”92 The word “well” directly 
preceded by “could” conveys that “well” means “easily” or “readily.”93 
Thus, by way of diction deduction, it becomes apparent that the 
majority considers actionable conduct to be conduct that “easily” or 
“readily” could dissuade a reasonable employee from filing or 
supporting a charge of discrimination. This interpretation of the 
majority’s standard equates with the majority’s imposition of a 
materially adverse standard in order to preclude an employee from 
inoculating himself or herself from those “petty slights or minor 
annoyances” that are an inevitable part of every work environment 
and that all employees endure.94 Certainly, “petty slights and minor 
annoyances” would not “easily” or “readily” dissuade an employee 
from filing or supporting a charge of discrimination. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Court’s most recent interpretation of the anti-retaliation 
provision is the bearing point for employers, employees, and courts 
sailing upon the provision’s waters. It replaces the disparate and 
incompatible direction previously proffered by the circuit courts. It 
also expands the navigable waters to all employer acts, thus reassuring 
employees that by pursuing or assisting the pursuit of a discrimination 
claim an employee need not endure those dissuasive actions of his or 
her employer that are marginally work-related. And by instituting a 
coherent materially adverse standard, the Court has allowed 
employers to remove the velvet glove, grasp the helm of their business 
without timidity, and treat employees in that zone of proximity 
following a discrimination claim as justly and fairly as they would any 
other, and no better. 
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